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A Decision Theory View of Auditing 
William L. Felix, Jr. 
University of Washington, Seattle 
The major objective of the field of applied statistics is to help solve decision 
problems i n the face of uncertainty. This help has traditionally been provided 
by making inferences based on a probability model. These probability models 
are the statistician's models of the uncertainty faced by a real world problem-
solver. The field of auditing has been the beneficiary over the past ten to fifteen 
years of increasing assistance from the field of applied statistics. This paper 
w i l l review these contributions and then consider a new contribution that is a 
logical next step. 
Dealing with Uncertainty 
The auditor is continually making choices i n the face of uncertainty. The 
first statistical recognition of this fact occurred wi th the use of classical statistics 
i n evaluating the results of random sampling. 1 The significance of this approach 
was not that uncertainty was first recognized, but that the risks associated with 
one particular aspect of auditing were made explicit. That is, the classical state­
ment of confidence interval and level (e.g., ± 50 at 95% confidence) specifies 
the risk of sampling error. 2 Thus one element of the uncertainty faced by an 
auditor with which he has always had to treat was now disclosed i n statistical 
terms. Given this beginning contribution, expansion of the potential uses of 
applied statistics to auditing, comparable to other disciplines facing uncertainty, 
should follow. 
In using classical sampling, the contribution of statistics is restricted to the 
evaluation of evidence obtained by random sampling. Incorporation of this 
evidence with other evidence is left to the auditor's judgment. More recently 
a method for combining sample evidence with other auditing evidence has been 
proposed.3 Inferential methods i n Bayesian statistics are based on a posterior 
probability distribution which is a combination of a prior probability distribu­
tion, representing evidence the auditor has evaluated up to the point of sampling, 
and a likelihood function, representing the information i n the sample. By sub­
jectively specifying the results of evidence evaluated up to a point of time as a 
probability function, the auditor has expanded the explicit recognition of the 
uncertainty he faces in carrying out an audit. Again , this uncertainty previously 
existed but was considered only through intuition and judgment. The advantages 
for the auditor that result from being more precise i n considering risk have been 
argued by Roberts.4 
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While classical sampling methods have met with some acceptance by the 
auditing profession, Bayesian sampling methods have not. One major reason for 
this lack of acceptance is the need for a practical method of expressing the prior 
probability distribution. Whi le some research has been carried out, a confidence-
inspiring method still awaits development.5 Another source of resistance to 
Bayesian methods is the "subjective" nature of the prior distribution. The use 
of classical sampling has been "sold" to some members of the auditing profession 
on the basis that it is more objective. Since the result of the audit process is an 
opinion or judgment decision, over-stating applied statistics as a source of 
objectivity can be misleading. Statistical methods discussed i n this paper can 
make the parameters or bases of judgment more explicit. 6 But even i f these 
approaches are carried to their full extent, judgment w i l be required as a critical 
input to the model. The prior probability distribution is an example of an input 
based on judgment. 
Both classical and Bayesian methods discussed above are methods of infer­
ence. The next logical step i n the use of applied statistics is to move from 
inference to action. A n audit action or decision can be addressed by use of 
statistical decision theory. Thi s methodology requires as an input a payoff 
function i n addition to the requirements for inference. This payoff function is a 
specification of the consequences of each possible outcome of the audit to the 
auditor. The use of this method allows the auditor to maximize i n the sense 
that he w i l l make the decision that has the highest expected payoff. 
In addition to the problems discussed above in applying Bayesian methods, 
the use of decision theory also requires an auditor to specify his payoff function. 
For each possible outcome of the audit he must specify the "value" (possibly in 
monetary terms) to h i m . 7 In the auditor's complex environment this specification 
of outcome consequences w i l l be quite difficult. For example, consider that an 
outcome consequence to an auditor w i l l probably represent a combination or 
matching of the form of his opinion and the discovery or lack thereof of a 
material error with the reaction of the firm (fee bargaining, lawsuits, future 
business), the reaction of users (lawsuits), the reactions of the regulators (right 
to practice, criminal prosecution), and the reaction of the rest of the auditor's 
environment (professional regulation, loss of other clients). 
The remainder of this paper w i l l illustrate the application of decision theory 
to a relatively constrained audit decision followed by a discussion of the prob­
lems involved in relaxing the constraints and the related need for research. 
Some discussion of the reasons for the author's bias that such inquiry is needed 
is incorporated i n these comments. 
A Decision Theory Model 
Audi t decision making can be described as a series of choices beginning 
with the acceptance of the client, followed by a series of choices as to type and 
quantity of evidence, and may conclude with the choice of opinion. The evolu­
tion of these choices is likely to be complex. For purposes of this discussion a 
single artificially isolated audit decision w i l l be modeled. 
100 
Suppose an audit of a single balance, B, such that Σ b i = B. The 
i=1 
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auditor's choice i n this examination is to give either a clean opinion (a 1 ) , or 
require an adjustment (a2), to B. The existence (s 1 ) , or absence (s 2 ) , of a 
"material error" i n B is the criterion which the auditor wishes to employ. This 
specification of possible actions, a i, and states of the balance, si, provides the 
basis for the construction of a payoff table as follows: 
Error S1 N o error S 2 
Clean opinion a1 
Adjustment a2 
In this payoff table the auditor w i l l put the consequences or payoffs to h i m of 
each action-state combination. The objective at this point is to choose payoffs 
that, while arbitrary, have some intuitive appeal. The values i n the following 
table represent dollars ( in thousands). 8 
S1 S 2 
Clean opinion a1 
Adjustment a 2 
- 2 0 7 
3 - 1 
The $7,000 amount i n the no error-clean opinion combination represents the 
fee net of ordinary expenses and is usually the most desired outcome. The no 
error adjustment combination is —$1,000 because it is assumed that the adjust­
ment involves extra audit work for which the client w i l l not pay. The $3,000 
amount i n the error adjustment combination represents extra work that i n part 
is billed and collected from the client. The —$20,000 for the error clean opinion 
combination represents the impact of a settlement with the client (or a third 
party) to not pursue a suit for negligence. 
The auditor plans to sample for evidence regarding the balance but before 
doing so, assesses his prior belief regarding the balance he is examining. Based 
on his knowledge of the client and of the system generating the balance, he 
states that S 1 , a material error, has a .10 chance of existing and S 2 an absence 
of a material error, has a .90 chance of existing. 
A t this point the auditor could decide to not sample and simply make a 
choice based on his prior probability distribution and his payoff function as 
stated in the payoff table. (Such a decision might be correct in decision theory, 
but the auditor must also respond to professional conventions which w i l l require 
at least some testing.) The criterion for choice is to select the action with the 
highest expected value. Using the auditor's prior probability distribution, these 
expected values are as follows: 
E (a 1 ) = E (clean opinion) = .1 ( - 2 0 ) + .9 (7) = 4.3 
E (a 2 ) = E (adjustment) = .1 (3) + .9 ( - 1 ) = - .6 
The decision indicated at this point is a clean opinion. 
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The auditor's next step is to collect additional evidence and modify his 
prior distribution. In obtaining and using sample evidence i n a decision theory 
framework some basic tools have been developed. The first is called the expected 
value of perfect information ( E V P I ) . It indicates the upper l imit on the value 
and thereby the amount that should be spent for additional information. The 
E V P I is computed by summing the values of the best action for each state, Si, 
weighted by its probability of occurring and then deducting the value or payoff 
of the best decision (a clean opinion) under the prior distribution. The expected 
value of the best decision is 3(.1) + 7(.9) = 6.6. Subtracting 4.3 results in an 
E V P I of 2.3. This indicates that no more than $2,300 should be spent on 
sampling. 
Perfect information is seldom available and, for this reason, the expected 
value of sample information ( E V S I ) is a useful number to the decision maker. 
T o compute this value, the decision maker must have or assume some knowledge 
about the population from which he plans to sample. In this case we w i l l 
continue making assumptions that keep the presentation and computations 
simple. 
The computation of E V S I requires the use of Bayes' Model to combine the 
audit decision-maker's prior probability with each possible sample outcome, 
compute the expected values of each possible outcome, and then identify those 
sample outcomes that would indicate a change from the decision indicated by 
the auditor's prior distribution. The E V S I for a particular sample size is the 
sum of the expected values of all actions for all sample outcomes indicating a 
change in decision weighted by the probability of that sample outcome occurring. 
The Appendix summarizes the computations of E V S I for a sample of five from 
the b i making up our balance, B. In this sample we have assumed that only 
two situations could exist i n the balance B. Either a material error exists, defined 
as exactly 20 b i's i n error by their total amount, or there is no material error 
which is defined as exactly 5 bi's i n error. Sampling is defined to be with re­
placement to permit use of binomial tables. The computed E V S I is .443. If the 
cost of taking each sample item is twenty dollars (.02 i n terms of the payoff 
matrix), the expected net gain of sampling ( E N G S ) to the auditor is E V S I less 
the cost of the sample or .443 — 5(.02) = .343. This value should be positive 
for a particular sample to be worthwhile. In this case the sample is worth $343 
to the auditor in terms of his payoff table. 
Given acceptable means of assessing prior beliefs and payoff functions, 
statistical decision theory presents auditors with an interesting and potentially 
desirable alternative. Us ing the expected net gain from sampling as a criterion, 
the auditor could compute the value of alternative sample sizes and choose a 
sample size that is optimal i n terms of his payoff function. The cost of sampling 
can be expected to increase in an approximately linear fashion while the E V S I 
w i l l tend to increase rapidly and then level out. Figure 1 approximates the effect 
of increasing sample size on E N G S . In this figure n * would be the optimal 
sample size. 
After the auditor chooses his sample size, he w i l l take the sample and 
evaluate it. H i s final decision is based on a terminal posterior probability distri­
bution based on actual rather than expected sample results. If i n the above 
example a sample of five were taken with two errors (as described above) 
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located, a specific terminal posterior distribution can be obtained. W h e n this 
posterior is combined with the loss function (table), either a1 or a 2 w i l l have 
a higher payoff indicating the appropriate action for the auditor to take. In 
the example the posterior distribution on the states would be: 
P (S 1 ) = .515 
P (S 2 ) =.485 
as indicated by the Appendix. The expected payoff of the two actions would be: 
a 1 : - 2 0 (.515) + 7 (.485) = -6.905 
a 2 : 3 (.515) + - 1 (.485) = 1.060. 
The indicated action is to require an adjustment to B. 
Extensions and Research 
The simplifications made i n the above illustration can be relaxed to develop 
a model more closely fitting actual audit decisions. Without actually construct­
ing an example, a modification particularly appropriate for audit decisions w i l l 
be proposed i n the following paragraphs. 
In comparing the above example to the auditor's decision environment, the 
first point that might occur to the experienced auditor is " i f only the real world 
were so simple!" Instead of a single decision i n isolation, the auditor i n exam­
ining a set of financial statements must make a series of complex, interrelated 
decisions as to the type and quantity of evidence to collect and evaluate. T o deal 
with this complexity, the profession has relied on good, "intuition based" judg­
ment developed through training and experience. A less charitable observer 
might add that auditors may tend to over-rely on conventional practices to deal 
with this complexity. For example, it has been observed that some practitioners 
do too much cash work. This event might be a result of relying on convention 
rather than good judgment. 
T o deal with the auditor's decision environment, the decision theorist needs 
a structure or sequential model of the auditor's decision or judgment processes. 
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FIGURE 1 
Such a model has not been clearly exposed i n the literature, but S A P N o . 54 
(now Section 320 of Statement on Audi t ing Standards N o . 1) does implicitly seem 
to include the framework of such a model. One possible view of that framework 
is as follows: 
1. The auditor engages i n a process of learning the client's operations, 
operating environment, accounting systems, and personnel. In a deci­
sion theory context he is collecting general evidence so that he can 
claim to be an expert with regard to the client and begin his examina­
tion with non-diffuse or concentrated prior probability distributions 
on each material element i n the financial statements. 
2. For each significant class of transactions the firm is likely to have 
a separate information subsystem providing the basis for one or more 
balances or parts of balances i n the financial statements. For each 
such subsystem, for the system handling miscellaneous transactions, 
and for the system combining the results into financial statements, 
the auditor evaluates the internal control. In a decision theory con­
text the auditor is assessing his belief to this point regarding the 
probability distribution on each accounting subsystem generating and 
not correcting a material error. 
3. Using the prior distribution developed i n (2) above, the auditor w i l l 
plan, both as to type and scope, systems (compliance) tests and out­
put (substantive) tests. In a decision theory context he is engaging 
i n assessing the expected net gain from sampling, E N G S , for both 
(1) different types of tests and (2) different sample sizes (up to and 
including a census). This assessment requires the use of a payoff 
function and is based on the expected results of sampling as the 
above example indicates. 
4. The execution of the plan established in (3) above w i l l in essence 
be a series of Bayesian revisions of the auditor's subjunctive beliefs 
regarding the financial statements based on the actual results of 
sampling. A t each major step in execution the auditor should revise 
his remaining plans based on the results of the preceding evidence. 
Each posterior distribution becomes a prior probability distribution 
for the next evidence collection activity. Note that at the conclusion 
of systems testing for all accounting subsystems, the auditor must 
combine the results of one or more systems to complete his prior 
assessment of balances. For example, the accounts receivable balance 
may be the result of an accounting subsystem for credit sales being 
combined with a cash collection subsystem. The posterior distribu­
tions for both systems should be combined for use as a prior distri­
bution in testing the accounts receivable balance. In addition, the 
interrelationship of financial statement balances would have to be 
considered. The results of tests of sales and cash balances could in­
fluence the posterior distribution on accounts receivable. 
5. Finally, the auditor reports his opinion on the financial statements 
choosing from among those opinions proscribed by his profession. 
In a decision theory context, this would be a final decision based on 
the payoff function and his confidence in the balances as expressed 
i n his terminal posterior distribution on the balances. 
While representing an untested suggestion, the above process clearly indi­
cates that a modeling of this complex series of decisions is a challenging task. 
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In practice the computations and analysis suggested by this process would require 
computer algorithms. 
In addition to the usual advantages of modeling judgment processes to gain 
insights for improvements and further productive research, decision theory seems 
to promise another possibility. 9 The auditor's current environment is litigation 
prone and many cases suggest that trouble for the auditor may have been 
the result of slow response to a changing environment. A n auditor may be 
undesirably slow to change because of the "weight" of professional conventions. 
A decision theory approach to an audit may encourage and help justify change 
in the face of this pressure from conventional practices because it provides a 
means of comparing alternative sources of evidence i n terms of criteria that 
should be convincing. 
Additional benefits that a decision theory approach to auditing may provide 
are in the area of communication. In the application of the current intuition/ 
judgment-based approach to scope and evidence source decisions, it is often 
difficult to articulate clearly the criteria used i n making decisions. If decision 
theory could make these criteria more explicit, it is likely that the on-the-job 
training and supervision of inexperienced assistants could be facilitated. In 
addition, communication between experienced auditors is less likely to be 
garbled if it is based on explicit agreement on risk and payoffs. Another aspect 
of communication relates to the evaluation of our services by society. Whi le 
certainly not a panacea, a decision theory approach may facilitate the documenta­
tion of decisions and criteria that w i l l be more convincing and less "mystic" to 
outsiders (such as attorneys and regulators). 
Concluding Observations 
In concluding an exploratory discussion of an untested source of new tech­
niques, it is appropriate to reinforce the problem areas that must be carefully 
researched before an evaluation of their usefulness can be made. There are at 
least three significant problems. The first is identification of the structure of the 
process discussed above. Second, as noted above, some research on assessing 
prior probability distributions has been published. But before such techniques 
can be considered practical for auditors, considerable additional effort i n devel­
oping appropriate distributions and means of training professionals i n their use 
is needed. T h i r d , the payoff function (table) used above needs considerable 
expansion and testing on auditors before any use of decision theory can be 
seriously considered. Basic texts in decision theory do develop the continuous 
payoff and probability function relationship that could be appropriate for audi­
tors. But they need testing and evaluation i n the auditor's environment. Further, 
the use of monetary values in an auditor's payoff function does not seem reason­
able. 1 0 Because of the extremely large amounts that a decision-state combina­
tion resulting i n a lawsuit might involve and the nonmonetary, or at least 
indirect, effects on reputation, a utility-based payoff function seems more reason­
able. 
In summary, decision theory offers considerable promise. Its basic promise 
that decisions under uncertainty are best made based on a probabilistic collection 
and evaluation of sample evidence structured in terms of economic criteria (the 
expected payoffs) is appealing as a model for the audit process. Whether or not 
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the application of decision theory to auditing w i l l result i n better audit decision­
making, better communication between auditors and their public, and better 
communication between auditors can be answered only through research. The 
outlook is promising. 
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Appendix 
The following tables show the computation of EVSI for a sample of 5 where the sampling 
distribution under S1 is a binomial distribution with p = .2 and under S2, p = .05. 
(1) 
Sample results 
(2) 
Prior 
(3) 
Likelihood of 
Sample Result* 
(4) 
Product of 
(2) • (3) 
(5) 
Posterior 
1. 0 error, 5 correct 
2. 1 error, 4 correct 
3. 2 error, 3 correct 
4. 3 error, 2 correct 
5. 4 error, 1 correct 
6. 5 error, 0 correct 
error .1 
correct .9 
error .1 
correct .9 
error .1 
correct .9 
error .1 
correct .9 
error .1 
correct .9 
error .1 
correct .9 
.3277 
.7738 
.4096 
.2036 
.2048 
.0214 
.0512 
.0011 
.0064 
.0000 
.0003 
.0000 
.03277 
.69642  
.72919 
.04096 
.18324  
.22420 
.02048 
.01926  
.03974 
.00512 
.00099  
.00611 
.00064 
.00000  
.00064 
.00003 
.00000 
.00003 
.045 
.955 
.183 
.817 
.515 
.485 
.838 
.162 
1.000 
.000 
1.000 
.000 
Sample Expected Change in Value of 
Outcome Action Payoff Decision? Sample Info 
1 a1 
a2 
—20(.045) + 7(.955) = 5.785 
3 (.045) + ( - 1 ) (.955) = - . 8 2 no 0 
2 a1 
a2 
-20(.183) + 7(.817) = 2.059 
3(.183) + (-1)( .817) = —.268 no 0 
3 a1 
a 2 
-20(.515 + 7(.485) = -6 .905 
3(.515) +(-1)(.485) = 1.060 yes 
1.060 - (-6.905) =7.965 
4 a1 
a2 
—20(.838) + 7(.162) = -15.626 
3(.838) + ( - 1 ) (.162) =2.352 
yes 2.352 - (-15.626) = 17.978 
5 a1 
a 2 
- 2 0 ( 1 ) + 7(0) = - 2 0 
3 ( l ) + ( - 1 ) ( 0 ) = 3 
yes 3 — (—20) = 23 
6 a1 
a 2 
- 2 0 ( 1 ) + 7 ( 0 ) = - 2 0 
3(1) + ( - 1 ) ( 0 ) = 3 
yes 3 - (—20) = 2 3 
EVSI = 7.965(.03974) + 17.978(.00611)+ 23 (.00064) + 23(.00003) = .443 
* The likelihood of the sample result is the probability of the sample result occurring given 
that the sample was from state S1, where the error rate is .2 or state S2 where the error rate is 
.05. The probabilities are from a binomial table. 
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